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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 218 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 15/04/1998 
Where it occurred: Near Ljubine Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Victim inattention Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: TA Name of source: BiH MAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast Ground condition: rocks/stones 
Date record created: 16/02/2004 Date  last modified: 16/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
No formal accident report was made by the Country MAC. A brief report was made by an ex-
pat Technical Advisor on behalf of the appropriate government office. Notification that the 
accident had occurred was delayed because the responsibility for reporting the accident was 
believed to lie with the QA group rather than the demining group. The content of the report 
and of a brief letter from the demining group to the UN MAC are summarised in what follows. 
The victim was one of a team of QA monitors who the demining group's contract required to 
be present on site during all work.  
The mined area was one of the "old defensive line held by Serbs against the Croats from the 
nearby town of Stolac. The demining group were conducting survey work in the area and 
had been on site for "several days". The area was described as very barren with open 
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countryside and many suspected minefields. The minefields being surveyed were expected 
to be faced by other minefields. The devices found had been "mostly" fragmentation mines. 
The site was a "very large location" over rocky terrain. The mined area being surveyed was 
around 40m deep and over 600m in length. The surveyors had only located fragmentation 
mines and tripwires at that time. Mines could be seen to the left of the direction of survey, so 
a decision was made to change direction to follow the visible mines.  
The monitor was reported to have walked the baseline to the end of the clearance site where 
a deminer was cutting a new lane in the revised direction. The deminer stopped work as the 
monitor approached (having completed around 5m). The monitor walked to the end of the 
clearance lane and on into the uncleared area, then on through an access route separating 
the fields.  
The deminer challenged him and he said "no problem" and walked on. After 25 metres he 
trod on a PMA-3 and was injured. He had stepped on a rock that had a mine beneath it. [He 
may have been using the rocks as stepping stones.] The team conducted a CASEVAC 
operation. They believed that the victim had probably sustained broken bones in his foot. 
The demining team stopped work and withdrew to base, leaving the site ready for the 
Accident investigation. 
The victim had been working since June 1977 and had "recently attended a QA and Accident 
Investigation course". 
 
Conclusions 
The investigator concluded that the accident occurred as a result of the victim's "total 
disregard of the inherent dangers of the area and [his] failure to conform to normal work 
procedures. 
 
Recommendations 
The report made no recommendations. 
A sketch of the site was on file - showing that that the victim was walking along a marked 
path (flanked by low stone walls) when the accident occurred. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 282 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Foot 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
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Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
it seems likely that the victim ignored basic safety requirements and there was no one on the 
site with authority to stop him. It seems likely that he had been inadequately trained and did 
not understand the risk he was taking, so the secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate 
training”. 
The victim was a QA monitor on the site [provided by the government] to ensure that the 
operation was carried out in accordance with approved procedure. 
It is possible that the victim was stepping on stones as he moved forward and was fortunate 
that the mine that initiated beneath the stone was small and the stone protected him from 
blast wave damage.  Alternatively, he may have been fortunate and stepped on the side of 
the PMA-3 and so avoided treading on the HE charge in the centre.   
The injuries resulting from stepping on a PMA-3 vary from traumatic amputation to minor 
bruising. The picture below shows why this happens. It shows a cut-away section through a 
PMA-3. The 35g Tetryl is in the top and centre of the mine. The area of pressure-plate 
surrounding the HE is actually larger than the area of pressure-plate over it. If a victim is 
fortunate, they step on the pressure plate but the explosive charge is not beneath their foot. 
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